Introduction
This essay analyzes the decision-making processes used by government agencies to approve or reject projects that have significant impacts on the environment. One may believe that an agency will use a well-defined procedural process for making decisions, but in reality, various internal and external factors have greater influences over the decision maker. This essay examines some of the real-life inputs into the decision-making process and analyzes the results of three agency decisions that affected the environment.
To begin with, I will describe some of the basic requirements for decision making as provided in the implementing regulations for the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). I will also discuss several academic observations about decision making with an emphasis on environmental assessments. I present three case studies involving different projects that were analyzed by government agencies using the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) process. For each example, I provide an overview of the project and the significant issues as documented in the respective EISs. I also describe the agencies' final decisions and the reasons given for each decision. I plan to demonstrate that government agencies tend to elevate social, cultural, and political concerns over the natural environment. In addition, I plan to demonstrate that unique factors influenced the decision maker in each situation.
In the next section, I describe some of the regulatory requirements for environmental decision-making.
Regulatory Requirements
In response to the 1960s environmental movement and several high-profile pollution incidents, the U.S. Congress passed NEPA in 1969. President Nixon signed NEPA into law on January 1, 1970. The Act created new requirements for assessing government-sponsored activities that have significant impacts on the environment. According to Diori Kreske (1996) , the U.S. Congress intended for NEPA to create a balance-a productive harmony-between environmental resources and people.
The Act has two main goals. First, agencies have to consider the environmental impacts of a proposed action before making a decision. Second, an agency has to inform the public that it considered these environmental impacts during its decision-making process. It is important to point out that NEPA does not require agencies to elevate environmental concerns over other appropriate political, economic, and social considerations. Rather, NEPA only requires agencies to take a hard look at the environmental consequences of a proposed action before implementing the action. Although Congress designed NEPA to achieve environmentally positive results through a compulsory procedural mechanism, NEPA simply prohibits uninformed, not unwise, agency decisions (Nowlin & Henry, 2008) .
On the other hand, scholars note that full disclosure of the environmental impacts can have a powerful influence on both the agency and the public (Bazerman et al., 2003) . The information gained through the EIS process may have the power to impact agency policy, the final decision, and/or society itself. If the public does not like the agency's final decision, it has the option of challenging the agency in court or electing influential politicians who support the public's position (Dietz & Stern, 2008) .
The NEPA process is supposed to improve the quality of decisions that have an effect on the environment. In particular, regulation 40 CFR 1500.1(c) states that NEPA's purpose is not to generate paperwork-even excellent paperwork-but to foster excellent action. Attorneys Michelle Nowlin and Thomas Henry (2008) note that "NEPA is founded on the premise that, by educating Federal decision makers about the environmental consequences of their actions, these officials would select more environmentally-positive courses of action" (p. 3). In other words, by knowing the consequences of a proposed action, the decision maker is expected to choose the most environmentally friendly option.
Another impact of NEPA is the infusion of public comments into the decision-making process. The passage of NEPA gave everybody a voice in decisions regarding use of public funds and public lands (Nowlin & Henry, 2008) . The infusion of public input into the decisionmaking process is supposed to result in better agency decisions (Dietz & Stern, 2008) . The Council on Environmental Quality agrees, noting that the best decisions are those that meet the needs of the community while minimizing adverse impacts on the environment (McGinty, 1997) .
In response to the passage of NEPA, government agencies developed procedures for assessing the effects of federal actions on the environment. These procedural requirements include instructions for conducting environmental impact assessments and preparing EISs. The EIS process is supposed to weigh the benefits versus the costs of the project. In accordance with regulation 40 CFR 1502.1, federal officials are supposed to use the information gained during the EIS development process, in conjunction with other relevant material, to plan actions and to make decisions. Through the EIS process, agencies have to publicly acknowledge the environmental consequences of their actions prior to actually taking the proposed action. Later in this essay, I describe three sets of EISs that were developed for projects that had significant impacts on the environment.
Both government agencies and the public have one potential shared misunderstanding about the EIS process-whether agencies make decisions beforehand, and then develop EISs to justify these decisions. Regulations specifically prohibit government agencies from doing this (see 40 CFR 1502.5). However, members of the public recognize that the draft EIS, issued for public commenting, will present a proposed recommendation for the decision maker's consideration, a rhetorical maneuver suggesting that the agency may have structured the EIS to support the proposed action under consideration. Ben Noller (2009) notes that "there is significant public skepticism as to whether federal agencies truly remain objective and candid during the NEPA process, especially when the agency is itself a proponent of the particular project rather than a permit-issuing arbiter" (p. 7). In other words, agencies that propose their own projects may be less objective in the NEPA process than third-party agencies.
Finally, in accordance with regulation 40 CFR 1505.2, each agency is required to prepare a concise public Record of Decision. The Record of Decision is supposed to state what the decision was, identify alternatives considered, and discuss relevant factors (economics, technical considerations, and agency mission) used by the agency when making its decision.
In the next section, I present several academic studies about decision making, with an emphasis on environmental assessments.
Literature Review
Academics have studied the decision-making process, and the results of these studies indicate that the decision maker must take into consideration many internal and external factors during the decision-making process. For example, Carolyn Rude (1995) studied technical and business decision-making. Rude suggests that decision makers must consider three criteria (technical, managerial, and social) when making a decision. Technical criteria include legal restrictions, standards, codes, and past precedents. Social criteria include the environmental impacts, cultural issues, ethical issues, and human values. Managerial criteria include costs, equipment, personnel, training, and demand. Ideally, the agency decision maker will consider all three criteria prior to making a decision that affects the environment.
Academics also suggest that environmental decision-making is a complex process. For instance, Thomas Dietz and Paul Stern (2008) comment that "environmental decisions present very complex choices among interests and values, so much that the choices are political, social, cultural, and economic, at least as much as they are scientific and technical" (pp. 7-8). Likewise, Robert Bartlett (1997) studied the rationality and logic of NEPA. Bartlett suggests that NEPA decisions are based in politics, in part, because NEPA does not mandate particular results.
Bartlett reinforces this idea by suggesting that NEPA "decisions are expected to be made in political ways, by political persons, in political settings" (p. 53). Similarly, Richard Shepard (2005) comments that the selection of the proposed action "almost always is based on social values, economic priorities, and political considerations" (p. 7). In other words, agency decision makers tend to elevate social and political concerns over the environmental costs of a project.
The ultimate goal of the environmental assessment process is a decision that is informed and defensible. However, this goal is difficult for several reasons due to the multiple objectives and pressures of the various stakeholders, the many conflicting constraints between the various environmental options, and the accumulation of large amounts of project-specific information that the public and decision maker have to consider. As a result, environmental assessment decisions fall into the "broad category of multi-objective, multi-criteria decisions" (Shepard, 2005, p. 4) .
One may wonder if agency decision makers actually use the information presented in an EIS. Various scholars have researched certain projects or specific agencies, and these scholars believe that the conclusions of the environmental impact assessment have little influence on the decision maker. Instead, the decision maker is influenced by the decision making process.
To begin with, Anne Hansen, Lone Kornov, Matthew Cashmore, and Tim Richardson (2013) suggest that decision-making is influenced by structures and actors. In particular, environmental impact assessment decision making "is not necessarily determined in the final approval at the end of the process, but is shaped by input from actors more or less continuously during the [assessment] process" (p. 39). In a case study, Hansen et al. concluded that the actors in a working group influenced the decision maker, and the findings presented in the environmental impact assessment report had little influence on the final decision.
Similarly, Ytsen Deelstra, Sibout Nooteboom, Ralph Kohlmann, Job van den Berg, and Sally Innanen (2003) suggest that "the world of decision-making is determined not only by formal procedures and governmental bodies, but also consists largely of informal processes wherein various actors negotiate with each other" (p. 520). The authors suggest that planned and structured environmental research seems of little importance to policy decision makers. Instead, the authors believe that "decision-making can be perceived as a game played by negotiating actors operating in informal and semi-formal forums" (p. 522). The goal of the game is to influence the decision maker. For this reason, the authors suggest that the environmental impact assessment report should concentrate on the issues that are important to the involved actors; otherwise, the report may not be used for decision making.
In addition, Luuc van Breda and Gerard Dijkema (1998) note that environmental "decision-making is unstructured, uncontrollable, and unpredictable. Furthermore, the actual contents of the [environmental impact assessment] contributed little to decision-making" (p. 391). Instead, the authors believe that the process of decision-making influenced the final decision more than the content of the environmental impact assessment report.
Finally, Marc Stern and Andrew Predmore (2011) studied the results of NEPA decisions within the U.S. Forest Service. They noted that NEPA and decision-making were not always coupled, but were commonly separated. The authors suggest that decision makers "tended to emphasize the importance of efficiency in NEPA processes while deemphasizing the importance of minimizing the negative social and environmental consequences of their actions" (p. 272).
One reason for this mindset is agency accountability. The authors suggest that agency decision makers are accountable to produce measurable outcomes dictated by fiscal year targets. As a result, decision makers desire to get proposed actions implemented as "cleanly and efficiently as possible" (p. 272). For example, the initial preferred alternative presented in an environmental assessment was selected about half of the time for complex projects and about three-fourths of the time for simple projects. That is, the agency demonstrated efficiency by consistently selecting the original proposed alternative.
In the following section, I present three examples of environmental decision-making, and I explain the major influences on the decision maker. Later in this essay, I will explain whether these three examples are in compliance with NEPA requirements and whether they are representative of the academics' conclusions. The benefits of the tower were significant. Besides providing the public with oldies music and local news, the station could provide emergency response broadcasts, especially during hazardous weather conditions. Supporters of the project included the Governor's office, local school district, and local law enforcement agencies. However, the local tribes objected to the radio tower because it would be constructed on Tsoodził, one of four sacred mountains. In the draft EIS, the Forest Service supported the tower, but in the final EIS, the agency supported the no-action alternative. The agency changed its mind based on external pressure from the Navajo and internal agency pressure to preserve Mt. Taylor as a traditional cultural property.
Three Examples of Environmental
KD Radio filed an appeal in June 2011. The decision was upheld a month later by the Forest Service (Krueger, 2011) . The agency ruled that the EIS process was conducted in accordance with Forest Service procedures; therefore, it was a valid and defensible decision.
However, based on the wording of the final decision, the door was left open for KD Radio, or some other company, to reapply-if the applicant could successfully reach out and obtain the support of the local tribes.
In summary, the agency's analysis concluded that the construction and operation of the tower would have resulted in little to no impact on the natural environment. Instead, the agency concentrated its rhetorical efforts on the cultural impacts of the tower. The Forest Service eventually denied the application due to these cultural impacts. In my opinion, the agency downplayed the beneficial social and economic impacts of expanded radio service during the EIS process. The Forest Service also appears to have rejected the application primarily to appease the Navajos. The Navajo benefitted from the decision, while the applicant and those who would have gained from improved radio service did not benefit.
What is remarkable about this decision is that it deviates from the norm. Nancy Coppola Notice, the BIA notified the public that the proposed action was to approve the mineral leases and associated surface use agreements. That is, the BIA planned to give WRI the necessary approvals to conduct strip-mining operations on the two properties. In 2009, after receipt of all remaining government approvals and permits, WRI began mining operations in the expanded areas. These expanded areas contains an estimated 77 million tons of coal. According to the executive vice president for WRI, "the Absaloka mine is somewhat unique in that it's one of the very few mines mining Native American coal" (Bushbaum, 2011, p. 49) . This partnership "has produced a significant amount of revenue for the Tribe" (Bushbaum, 2011, p. 49 ) through royalty payments, taxes, and employment opportunities.
In summary, the BIA conducted an assessment of the impacts of coal mining on the Crow Indian Reservation in Montana. The BIA focused its attention on the short-term socioeconomic benefits-efficient mining operations, use of coal for power production, and income to the Crow Indians-over all other factors. Despite the environmental damage that mining would cause, the Crow supported these strip-mining operations because of the short-term financial benefits they would receive. In my opinion, the BIA downplayed the negative effects of coal mining and coal burning during the environmental assessment process. There are indications that the BIA intended to approve the project prior to development of the draft EIS, and the agency appeared to implement the EIS process simply to comply with NEPA requirements.
After completion of the EIS process, the Crow discovered that mining operations had destroyed one of their cherished cultural sites-a bison kill site. The Crow tribe was critical of the mine operator and the BIA after it became aware of the loss. This incident initiated a public debate as to whether the BIA conducted a sufficient cultural resource inventory during the EIS process. In my opinion, the BIA didn't provide sufficient information to the public about the cultural resources that would be impacted during mining. Instead, the BIA apparently expected the public to obtain this information outside of the EIS process.
In recent years, the coal industry has experienced a significant downturn, and the downturn has dramatically affected the Absaloka Mine. The mine's annual output has decreased in recent years, due to decreased domestic demand for coal, and the economic benefits to the Crow have declined accordingly. The mine operator hopes that international demand for coal will increase; otherwise, the future looks bleak for the Absaloka coal mine.
Discussion
Recall that NEPA has two main goals-that an agency has to consider the environmental impacts of a proposed project and that the agency has to inform the public about these impacts.
All three agencies-Army, Forest Service, and BIA-implemented the requirements of NEPA by conducting the required analyses although the Army conducted its analysis under court order.
All three agencies informed the public of their respective conclusions via draft EISs, final EISs, and Records of Decision.
The Army chose to conduct live-fire training in the Makua Valley due to political considerations, the Forest Service chose the no-action alternative due to cultural concerns, and the BIA approved strip-mining operations due to economic and mining efficiency priorities. All three agencies concluded that the economic and social aspects of the human environment outweighed the natural environment. That is, each agency chose a course of action based on social, cultural, or political impacts of the project versus the natural or physical environmental impacts. This finding is in agreement with the opinions of Dietz and Stern (2008) as well as Bartlett (1997) who point out that NEPA does not require agencies to elevate environmental concerns over other appropriate political, economic, and social considerations. Daniel Bronstein, Dinah Baer, Hobson Bryan, Joseph DiMento, and Sanjay Narayan (2005) remind us that "the underlying principle of NEPA is that all impacts of a project are eventually social, as they ultimately affect people" (p. 675).
During my review of the three sets of EIS documents, I noted that the agency authors concentrated on a particular angle or point of view. The Army concentrated its rhetorical efforts on fulfilling its mission. Timothy Brady (1990) points out that the temptation is great for the agency seeking to perform some action to write an EIS to allow itself to achieve its statutory mission. Since the Army rhetorically structured the EIS to support its position, one could argue that this was analogous to the Army being a biased proponent of the project.
Lisa Berzok (1986) discusses several mistakes that agencies make during the environmental assessment process. One mistake is that agencies incorrectly design and define the projects prior to the environmental impact assessment. For example, many agencies "define their objectives so narrowly that only a similarly narrow project definition can meet them" (Berzok, 1986, p. 121) . I suggest that the Army fell into this trap when it established criteria so narrow that only the Makua Military Reservation met the project objectives. Not surprisingly, the Army chose to use the Makua Military Reservation for training based on the criteria that it had established.
The Forest Service was a third-party arbitrator, and the agency concentrated its rhetorical efforts on the cultural drawbacks of the project. I believe that the Rinconada Communication Site EIS decision could have gone either way. There was no clear evidence that the agency was a proponent or opponent of the project, although the Navajo's opinions weighed heavily on the final decision of the agency.
The BIA concentrated its rhetorical efforts on the short-term benefits over the costs to society and the environment. Because the BIA appeared ready to approve the mine expansion from the beginning, I wondered whether the BIA used the EIS process to justify its decision.
Regulation 40 CFR 1502.5 prohibits government agencies from using the EIS process to justify decisions already made. After my review of this EIS process, I decided that the BIA was demonstrating a paternalistic attitude towards the Crow, instead of being a proponent of the stripmining project itself. The Indian Mineral leasing Act of 1938 stipulates that the U.S. government must approve all mineral leases, and the BIA is the agency responsible for the federal government-Indian trust relationships. Because of this paternalistic attitude, I suspect that the BIA would have approved any project that benefitted the Crow.
Earlier in this essay, Rude (1995) suggested that decision makers must consider three criteria (technical, managerial, and social) when making a decision. The Army appeared to concentrate on technical and managerial criteria when it emphasized its statutory mission, procedural requirements, training requirements, and costs. The Army appears to have initially downplayed the social criteria, much to the chagrin of the local public. The Forest Service and BIA both appear to concentrate on the social criteria at the expense of the technical and managerial criteria.
As discussed earlier, academics (Deelstra et al., (2003) ; Hansen et al., 2013; van Breda & Dijkema, 1998) The decision maker's selection of a hybrid of the proposed alternative appears to be a compromise to the outside stakeholders; although, one could argue that this compromise was still in the Army's favor. Finally, the BIA also appeared determined to approve the expansion of the coal mine, in part, because there was no real opposition to the project, prior to tribal discovery that mining operations had destroyed a sensitive bison kill site. Stern and Predmore (2011) suggested that agency decision makers are influenced by efficiency and accountability. All three decision makers demonstrated some level of focus on agency goals. To begin with, the Army was focused on meeting its mission and internal procedures. However, the Army's EIS process was not efficient due to various external factors.
First, the Army spent years creating a 6,000-page EIS document that was not rhetorically effective with the local public. Further, the Army was forced, multiple times, to implement the NEPA process by local courts. The Army might have been more successful if it had effectively reached out to the public during the original scoping process.
The Forest Service appeared to demonstrate efficiency and accountability when it denied the appeal. In its denial, the agency focused on its compliance with internal procedures (Krueger, 2011) claiming that the original decision-denial of the permit for the tower-was appropriate.
According to the Forest Service, the denial was appropriate because the EIS process was conducted in accordance with agency procedures. In a different matter, the Army appears to have been unsuccessful in its implementation of the EIS process. To begin with, the Army spend considerable resources to create a 6,000-page EIS that was unconvincing to the local public, primarily because the Army didn't really address the concerns of the audience. Earlier in this essay, Deelstra et al. (2003) suggested that the environmental impact assessment report should concentrate on the issues that are important to the involved actors; otherwise, the report may not be used for decision making. Initially, the Army did not concentrate on the issues that were important to the locals, and as a result, the Army had to spend more time and resources upgrading the EIS product. Further, I question whether anyone, including the deciding official, actually read the entire 6,000-page final EIS.
I suggest that the Army incorrectly assessed the external social and political influences and failed to incorporate these influences until later into the EIS process. As Carolyn Rude (1995) notes that "social and political factors, which are hard to measure or prove, can nevertheless affect the success of the decision" (p. 190). The Army's failure to consider the social and political factors early in the process resulted in considerable losses of time and money.
In addition, the Army appeared committed to using the Makua Valley for live live-fire training from the beginning. As Rude (1995) points out, "a commitment to a position discourages a change" (p. 185). The Army was committed to using Makua Military Reservation for live-fire testing, and its commitment to this position resulted in considerable costs and years of legal battles.
Conclusions
This essay analyzed the results of three decision-making processes used by government agencies to approve or reject projects that have significant impacts on the environment. I tried to determine how these decisions fit into NEPA requirements. The purpose of NEPA, as provided in regulation 40 CFR 1500.1(c), is to promote better decisions:
Ultimately, of course, it is not better documents but better decisions that count. NEPA's purpose is not to generate paperwork-even excellent paperwork-but to foster excellent action. The NEPA process is intended to help public officials make decisions that are based on understanding of environmental consequences, and take actions that protect, restore, and enhance the environment.
However, in all three case studies (Army, Forest Service, and BIA), the agencies elevated social, cultural, and political considerations over environmental concerns. Both the Army and the BIA made decisions that didn't necessarily protect, restore, and enhance the environment.
Academics (Bartlett, 1997; Dietz & Stern, 2008; Shepard, 2005) have previously suggested that government agencies would elevate human concerns over environmental concerns . Bronstein et al. (2005) agree, pointing out that "the underlying principle of NEPA is that all impacts of a project are eventually social, as they ultimately affect people" (p. 675). I suggest that many decision makers will probably decide that a project's social, cultural, and political impacts are more important than the environmental impacts. The U.S. Congress intended for NEPA to create a balance-a productive harmony-between environmental resources and people (Kreske, 1996) . I question whether today's decision-making processes are representative of this balance, as intended by Congress, or whether Bartlett (1997) is correct-all environmental decisions are political in nature.
I considered the role of the EIS in environmental decision-making. According to regulation 40 CFR 1502.1, an EIS is more than a disclosure document. Further, the EIS shall be used by federal officials in conjunction with other relevant material to plan actions and make decisions. Some academics (Deelstra et al., 2003; Hansen et al., 2013; van Breda & Dijkema, 1998) suggest that the EIS process, not the EIS conclusion, influences the decision maker. Of my three case studies, only one decision (the Forest Service) appears to have been influenced by the process. The Army appears to have been influenced by internal pressures, while the BIA didn't experience any real internal or external pressures.
I would like to close this essay with the advice of Joseph Arvai (2003) . Arvai provides several recommendations for an effective decision-making process. This process should include a well-defined problem, the incorporation of values and objectives, and informed trade-offs between the various positions. Arvai suggests that "people may be more likely to accept decisions resulting from processes that seem fair, reasonable, and amenable to allowing all interested parties an opportunity to voice their feelings and concerns" (p. 286). This "suggests that it is not necessarily the results of participatory decision-making process that are important to people...rather, the process employed in attaining the decisions may be equally, if not more, important" (Arvai, 2003, p. 288) . In other words, members of the public who participate in the decision-making process may be able to support the resulting policy decision, even if that decision does not result in the outcome that the public wanted. Perhaps the Army could have saved itself a lot of time and trouble if it had allowed the public to become more involved at an earlier time in the decision-making process?
Future Research Opportunities
During my research of environmental decision-making, I identified a number of academic articles discussing the growing use of formal analytical tools and methodologies for systematic decision-making. For example, Ivy Huang, Jeffrey Keisler, and Igor Linkov (2011) describe a tool called multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA), a formal methodology that can be used to compare alternative courses of action.
According to Huang et al. (2011) , one commonly used MCDA is analytic hierarchy processes/analytic network processes (AHP/ANP). This tool compares paired criteria, asking which is more important, to produce weighted scores. Using the AHP/ANP process, it is possible that each alternative in an EIS could be assigned a numerical score. The alternative with the highest score could be considered the best alternative for selection; although, the score of each alternative could be manipulated by how the problem is structured and weights assigned.
None of the agencies discussed in this essay (Army, Forest Service, and BIA) used analytical tools or methodologies for their systematic decision-making. As noted earlier, many academics suggest that the process of decision making appears to have more impact over the decision maker than the results of an environmental assessment. Perhaps agencies can use these types of tools to promote decisions that are based on the recommendations provided in an environmental assessment report.
